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European governments have re-discovered labour migration. The Italians have 
devised quota systems for the Mediterranean neighbours, the Irish government 
recruits nurses, Germany’s so-called “green card” initiative was aimed at attracting 
highly skilled employees in the information technology sector, while in Britain a 
points-based migration scheme will be introduced that is clearly inspired by similar 
schemes in classic countries of immigration. Even the French government, long 
ideologically opposed to actively managed migration, is facilitating procedures for the 
recruitment of highly skilled foreigners.  Labour market shortages and advocacy from 
employer associations is sparking a remarkable renaissance of labour migration 
schemes.  Trade unions notably support such calls for regulated or carefully 
“managed” migration, preferring it to unregulated labour flows feeding into black 
market economies. But “managed migration”, the watchword of new regulatory 
policy, is also associated with a more restrictive stance towards unsolicited channels 
of immigration, especially political asylum, and second order categories, including 
prominently family reunion.   
 
European migration policies are indeed “in flux” (Boswell 2003). But who 
drives these changes? How can we account for the “gap” (Hansen 2002) between 
restrictionist rhetoric and slightly more permissive practice?  
In this paper, I argue that the formation of labor migration policy, a core 
component of the new paradigm of managed migration, is shaped by the actions and 
positions of non-state actors, principally labor market interest associations such as 
trade unions and employer associations. The role of such interest groups has not 
  2attracted major scholarly interest
1, perhaps owing to a somewhat state-centric bias in 
the literature on comparative European migration politics.  It is argued that labor 
market interest associations’ positions reflect the national productive systems they are 
embedded in, operationalized in terms of the relative size of component sector of the 
economy, a low skill vs. high skill strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001), observed labor 
market shortages and reliance on the undocumented labor market. Informed by the 
comparative political economy literature it is argued that such production systems will 
influence employers and unions in the nature, skill level, training and magnitude of 
labor migration they will advocate. Thus, in high-wage high-skill countries such as 
Germany particular emphasis is placed on highly skilled labor migrants, while 
employers in Ireland and the UK will seek to recruit migrants at both ends of the skill 
curve. Liberal market economies (LMEs) commonly possess significantly sized low-
wage low-skill sectors, which require labor demand, and will influence employer 
positions accordingly. Henceforth, different models of capitalism condition the 
demands employers and unions will make with respect to labor migration policies. 
 
The Argument in More Detail 
Differences in the systems of political economy will translate into different 
labour recruitment strategies because of the activities of interest groups. Labour 
market interest associations call for labour recruitment schemes. These efforts partly 
account for the puzzle of European governments tolerating or even soliciting 
immigration despite largely hostile public opinion (Lahav 2005) and highly restrictive 
rhetoric by government officials. This paradox has previously been partially 
accounted for by the activities of liberal courts (Hollifield 1992, Joppke 1998 
                                                 
1 Examples for recent scholarly work which does examine the role of trade unions and employers in 
influencing migration policy includes Haus (2002), Watts (2002), Freeeman (2002) and earlier Castles 
and Kosack (1973).  
  3Guiraudon 2000, 2001), while Freeman’s pioneering work (1995, 2002, 2006) has 
emphasized the importance of client politics in liberal democracies, though principally 
the United States, where well-organized employer groups and ethnic advocacy groups 
combine efforts to press for liberal policies from which they benefit and whose costs 
are diffused. Though compelling in its empirical application and rightfully applauded 
for its introduction of a political economy angle, Freeman’s work has been criticized 
for not being applicable to the European context (Joppke 1999), not addressing non-
economic forms of migration such as political asylum (but see Freeman 2006) and for 
neglecting how immigration is framed and thus perceived by actors (Statham and 
Geddes 2006). Correcting Freeman’s analysis somewhat, it is maintained that 
employers will not simply lobby for “more liberal” policy, but rather the production 
system in which they are embedded conditions the quality and quantity of labor 
migration advocated. Addressing Statham’s and Geddes’ (2006) concern, it is argued 
that employer association have successfully defined “competitiveness” as a central 
concern for national policy-makers and have demonstrated how immigration can help 
provide the required human resources necessary to ensure economic competitiveness. 
National security is thus a more flexible term than most analysts of “securitization” 
have acknowledged (Buzan et al. 1998, Bigo 2001, Huysmans 2000, 2006) and need 
not be limited to associations with political extremism and terrorism.  
 
But I do not simply seek to submit the claim that interest groups “matter”, 
rather I explore how and why they influence governmental actors in the pursuit of 
their preferences. It is not their mere absence or presence that shapes governmental 
policy, as earlier Europeanization analysts posited (Heritier et al. 2001, Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 2002: 260ff.) but their relative power. Labor market interest associations 
  4are usually organizationally stronger, though they need to create new links with 
ministries of interior affairs in addition to the existing and often well-established 
channels of influence to ministries of labor and social affairs.  
 
 
The literature on European migration, though growing exponentially (early: 
Castles 1974, King 1993, Fassmann and Munz 1994, Hollifield, Cornelius, and Martin 
1994, Ucarer and Puchala 1997, Angenendt 1999, Geddes 2000, 2002, Joppke and 
Guiraudon 2001, Lavenex and Ucarer 2002, Lahav 2004, Messina and Lahav 2006) is 
empirically very rich and valuable, but is often conceived in isolation and not linked 
to broader theoretical debates outside the subfield (a notable exception is Guiraudon 
2000). The existing literature commonly describes political developments in 
individual EU member states (Fassmann and Munz 1994, Hollifield, Cornelius, and 
Martin 1994, Ucarer and Puchala 1997, Castles and Miller 1998, Angenendt 1999), 
analyzes EU level policy developments (Geddes 2000) or combines both (Geddes 
2003, Faist and Ette 2006). Recent work examines the position of trade unions – 
though not employers – in a few select European countries (Haus 2002, Watts 2002).  
 
  Recent advances in comparative political economy have stressed the resilience 
of national models or varieties of capitalism (Crouch and Streeck 1997, Soskice 1999, 
Coates 2000, Scharpf and Schmidt 2000, Hall and Soskice 2001, Amable 2003, 
Hancke, Rhodes, Thatcher 2007). This highly influential line of reasoning highlights 
the persistence of multiple equilibria in the institutional configuration of systems of 
political-economic governance, encompassing systems of industrial relations and 
labor market regulation, vocational training and education, corporate governance and 
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between liberal and coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs), while other 
analysts compliment this taxonomy by sketching a southern statist model (Amable 
2003) and an amalgated eastern model (Stark and Bruszt 2001, Myhknenko 2007).   
 
The first hypothesis is  that the capacity of domestic interest group coalitions 
to influence national governmental policy depends on three variable clusters: firstly, 
their organizational coherence, secondly, the degree of internal consensus on policy, 
and thirdly, access to government. “Influence” is defined as a substantial similarity 
between non-state actors’ publicly stated interests, assessed in interviews and review 
of primary sources, and regulatory outcome. 
 
In a second step of analysis, the hypothesis is being advanced that employer 
preferences are shaped by the production systems they are embedded in
2. These 
production systems are defined as containing two variable clusters: relative size of 
component sector of the economy (primary/secondary/tertiary sector) and a low skill 
versus high skill strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001)
3.  
 
 Different national production strategies, recently identified in the comparative 
political economy literature (Hall and Soskice 2001, Amable 2003, Menz 2005),  
influence national migration management, though it is only relatively recently that 
                                                 
2 For reasons of space constraints, this paper will focus on labor market policy and leave out NGOs’ 
impact on asylum policy. 
3 But note that other factors matter as well – since they vary over time and are difficult to 
operationalize, they will not be tested formally. These include the pool of domestically available human 
resources, which will limit the incentive to “look abroad”, short-term temporary labor market shortages 
and an implicit  reliance on undocumented labor that will obviously not be readily acknowledged by 
employers. 
  6such strategies have diverged sufficiently to produce substantially different policy 
outcomes
4.  
 Henceforth, we would expect to note difference between national migration 
strategies in coordinated market economies (CMEs) such as Germany and liberal 
market economies such as Britain. In a CME, such as Germany, we would expect to 
see an employer preference for highly skilled top tier labor migration. In addition, 
given the continuing importance of the secondary tier (table 2), manufacturing sector 
employers may be particularly active.  By contrast, in a LME like Britain, employers 
are likely to advocate recruitment of  both highly skilled labor for select niches with 
labor shortages and for poorly paid sectors of the labor market that experience 
recruitment problems and high staff turnover due to low wages, poor morale and 
prestige, and unappealing working conditions. The service sector is much more 
important, as noted above (see also table 1). France serves as a control case, its 
political economy comes closer to a German-style CME, though arguably it is a less 
pure example. We would expect employer preferences there to be less strongly 





                                                 
4 During the trente glorieuses, labor shortages existed across all economic sectors, hence skill levels of 
potential migrants did not concern policy-makers. However, in the wake of the decline of the primary 
and secondary sector in favor of the tertiary sector of the economy and the concomitant pursuit of 
divergent production strategies in coordinated versus liberal market economies, national labor 
recruitment strategies do diverge to a much greater degree. Of course, given the pan-European 
character of the structural metamorphosis of the economy (see table 2), all national policy-makers can 
be expected to solicit labor migrants for vacancies in the service sector, but to different degrees. 
However, in high-wage high-skill countries associated with coordinated market economies, particular 
emphasis is placed on highly skilled labor migrants, while liberal market economies attract migrants at 
both ends of the  skill curve. They commonly possess significantly sized low-wage low-skill sectors, 
which require labor demand, and will shape overall migration management accordingly. 











Percent of the GDP       Percent of the labor force 
 
UK  agriculture  1.1      1.5 
French  agriculture   2.5      4.1 
German  agriculture   1.1      2.8 
 
UK  industry    26.1      19.1 
French  industry   21.4      24.4 
German  industry   28.6      33.4 
 
 
UK  services    72.9      79.5 
French  services   76.1      71.5 
German  services   70.3      63.8   
 
Table 1 : Sectoral Composition and Distribution of Workforce in the UK, 
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Structure of interest intermediation  
 
Interest groups do possess access channels to national decision-makers, but 
often these are informal, highly contingent, and fragile. While formal venues for 
tripartite interest intermediation exist, notably in the form of the consultative body 
Economic and Social Council  (Conseil Economique et Sociale), such fori cannot be 
equated in their importance with northern European neocorporatist arenas, and indeed 
informal access avenues are arguably much more pivotal. Most importantly, similar 
socialization and education patterns among the administrative and the business elite 
(“enarquie”) enable representatives of employers to operate within a network of 
acquaintances with shared norms, perceptions, and ideas, leaving trade union at a 
distinct comparable disadvantage. This means that these actors in particular are reliant 
on amiable relations with public policy-makers so as to be invited to parliamentary 
hearings, informal and often ad hoc hearings within the ministry, and possess a fair 
chance to have lobbying efforts received (interview FR–GOV-1).  
The French system of political economy presents a curious mixture of liberal 
and statist elements (Schmidt 1996, 2002, Levy 1999, Amable 2003). Indeed, while 
the close nexus between government and organized business remains a constant 
feature, the power dynamics have changed radically. The close links between 
employers and the government remain, but in a system of “post-statism” the 
employers seem to wield significant or even predominant power in this relationship. 
Hence, business-friendly policy may be implemented by the state, but driven by 
employer initiative (cf. Hancké 2002, Levy 2005). The comparative political economy 
generally considers France as a country emulating Rhineland-style high-quality high 
  9value-added production patterns to a degree (Boyer 1997), yet it cannot truly be 
considered a coordinated market economy. It is certainly not underpinned by a 
Germanic system of industrial relations (Lallement 1999). Thus, trade unions are 
disproportionately well represented at the national level, despite the feeble degree of 
unionization at the grassroots level, particularly outside the public sector. The 
country’s current corporate structures (Hancké 2002) exacerbate this potential, as 
many economic sectors are characterized by quasi-oligopolistic markets dominated by 
a few internationally active corporations, a weak tier of small and medium sized 
enterprises, and a plethora of small companies, often involved at the bottom end of the 
production process.  
 
Given this corporate structure, reflected in the powerful position enjoyed by 
major corporations within the employer organization MEDEF, there is no strong 
consensus within the French business camp on strategies for labor recruitment: The 
major internationally active players may not be adverse to recruiting highly skilled 
migrants, but rely largely on home-grown talent.  
French employers are organizationally relatively feeble, which may be partly 
compensated by their good access to government. Most importantly, similar 
socialization and education patterns among the administrative and the business elite 
(“enarquie”) enable representatives of employers to operate within a network of 
acquaintances
5, but they do not share a common position on migration yet. Amongst 
employers, there is some potential for very diverging interests between those that are 
prepared to take advantage of semi-legitimate or outright substandard labor market 
tiers and those that resist their emergence.  
                                                 
5 These informal connections continue to exist to this very day. Of course, family ties also play an 
important role. Thus, the brother of Nicholas Sarkozy, newly elected French President, is a senior 
officer within MEDEF.  
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The 1998 Chèvenement Law does permit the fast-track processing of 
residency and work permit applications by “desirable” labor migrants and current 
discourse about attracting skilled migrants seems to be driven by employer 
preferences, yet the MEDEF is very wary about openly acknowledging such lobbying 
efforts. There are economic sectors and companies that do rely disproportionately on 
immigrants, often of long tenure in France, but there are two dynamics that seems to 
keep business actors from lobbying openly in favor of liberal labor recruitment 
schemes. First, de-industrialization and competition from low-cost high-quality 
production sites in manufacturing not only from East Asia, but also Central Europe, 
and from Francophone North Africa for low-cost service provision such as 
telemarketing mean that certain sectors are no longer likely to expand or in some 
cases even sustain production sites in France. Thus, additional labor recruitment in 
such sectors is not supported by employers. Second, low unionization rates permit an 
often fairly casual compliance with wage agreements and statutory working 
conditions. De facto secondary tiers of the labor market already exist in France and 
many, though not all, of these “three D” jobs (dirty, dull, dangerous) are filled by 
foreigners. This is particularly true in some sectors of the economy, notably 
hospitality and gastronomy, construction, seasonal agricultural work, and textile. 
Remarkably, the most common infraction found by French labor inspectors (Ministère 
de la Justice 1999) is not the employment of individuals not entitled to work on 
French territory, but rather illicit forms of employment that contravene existing labor 
laws, for example regarding working hours, remuneration, or health and safety. 
French business disposes of a ready pool of domestically available labor, employable 
at often substandard conditions. This does not, however, mean that immigrants are not 
  11welcomed, not least in such substandard tiers of the labor market, but such practices 
are not openly acknowledged, much less endorsed. Terray (1999 cited in Freedman 
2004) analyzes employer lobbying activity against the March 1997 Barrot Law that 
would have shifted the burden of proof in cases of infractions against employment 
laws on the employers, thus forcing employers to prove credibly that they were not 
aware of labor law violations, including in instances further down the sub-contracting 
chain. These efforts were successful and more recent legislative measures once again 
seek to punish the employee
6.   
For many years the employers were not enthusiastic about labor migration 
(Watts 2002)
7.  At least in its official stance, the MEDEF does not endorse managed 
labor recruitment as a general policy. Officially, sectoral employers even assume a 
somewhat protectionist position, perceiving it as somewhat of a menace to the 
relatively stable primary labor market (Menz 2005)
8.  
                                                 
6 This would not surprise Terray who argues that “legislation […] keeps foreigners without any legal 
status in a state of vulnerability which makes them exploitable, but at the same time permits them to 
remain in France in sufficient numbers […] to give those employers practising “localized outsourcing” 
the effectives that they require. […] Prosecutions are rare, convictions exceptional, and they practically 
never catch the real employers” (Terray 1999, 22 in Freedman, 2004, 85).  
7 Historically, French business, especially primary sector companies in the first part of the 20
th century 
and major manufacturing companies in fields such as construction, automobile assembly, metallurgy, 
and iron and steel during the postwar boom, were, of course, highly interested in labor recruitment, 
even assisting, and arguably surpassing the efforts and indeed the importance of the governmental labor 
recruitment office ONI and earlier its pre-World War I predecessor SGI (Weil 1991). While the ONI – 
and before it the SGI and the bilateral treaties it helped administer - focused exclusively on European 
migrants, its slow and inefficient operations  and its de facto inappropriate brief given not only the 
importance of non-European countries of origin, but also the fact that migration from the Iberian 
peninsula had to be clandestinely in nature on account of the authoritarian nature of the Franco and 
Salazar regimes, meant that the employers almost designed and operated labor migration themselves, or 
at least heavily influenced both the broad contours. They were actively involved in facilitating 
administration at the microlevel.  Renault representatives recruiting workers in Algerian villages or 
local authorities legalizing post-hoc the new arrivals provided they could prove stable employment 
point to the pre-eminent role played by business in labor recruitment in France historically. By 1968, 
such post-hoc régularisations represented more than 80 percent of all entries (Dictionnaire 2004). In 
this sense, the 1975 recruitment stop also meant a restatement of statist authority. However, seasonal 
labor migration continued even after 1974 and remained significant for agriculture in particular 
(Hollifield 2000, 121). 
8 But over the past five years, this stance has begun to change. The right-wing business-friendly think 
tank Institut Montaigne, headed by outspoken member of the supervisory board of insurance giant 
AXA Claude Bébéar, advocates the introduction of migration quotas and the active recruitment of 
highly skilled migrants in particular (Le Point 7 May 2002, Le Figaro 15 February 2006). Its list of 
financial supporters reads like a who is who of major French CAC40-listed corporations, including 
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For the trade unions the situation presents itself slightly differently. The 
historical position of French unions vis-à-vis immigration has been characterized by 
some degree of skepticism, influenced by anxieties over possible downward wage 
pressures or immigration being used as a bargaining chip to this end by employers. 
However, this position has evolved since towards a more positive stance and the 
position that immigrant rights and working conditions have to be defended and uphold 
(Watts 2002). Organizationally unions are weak, their access to government limited. 
There is also no strong consensus on immigration policy. Trade unions focus more on 
bread and butter issues that directly impact their members. Issues closer to the heart of 
the union movement involve anti-discrimination and anti-racism in the workplace 
(interview FR- TU1).  
 
 
Development of immigration policy since 1989 and the role of private actors 
 
  By the late 1990s, French policy-makers began contemplating exploring active 
labor migrant recruitment. As early as 1998, an internal administrative circular had 
advised provincial governments to consider “fast-tracking” (or at least consider with 
leniency) residency permit application from information technology experts
9. While 
the dogma of zero immigration was slowly being abandoned
10, even among the 
                                                                                                                                            
among others Total, LVMH, Bouygues, BNP Paribas, Carrefour, Capgemini, Sodexho, Viendi and 
Suez (www.institut-montaigne.org).   
9 Circulaire DPM / dm2-3 / 98 / 767 du 28 décembre 1998, see also Morice 2000. 
10  This was stated explicitly in the joint Franco-British-German proposal tabled at the Council of 
Ministers meeting in Luxembourg on 4 October 1999, in preparation of the Tampere summit. Note, 
however, that this call for a CAMP carried also strong language about the danger of illegal migration 
and crime, often confounding the two (Joint Note by France and Germany concerning 
asylum/migration for the European Council in Tampere, 15/16 October 1999, dated 17.9.99 and UK, 
France Germany Note, 4.10.99). 
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11, active labor migration recruitment is still in its infancy, and somewhat 
contested territory. The establishment of the new National Agency for the Reception 
of Foreigners and Migrations [sic] (Agence Nationale de l’Accueil des Etrangers et 
des Migrations=ANAEM), responsible for administering the new “reception and 
integration contracts” rolled out first as pilot projects in 2003 and nationwide since 
2005 (enshrined in Law 2005-32 of 18 January 2005), which oblige new migrants to 
partake in cultural and linguistic training programs and to accept the legal and cultural 
“republican” national values, while remarkable, may represent further movement into 
this direction, solidifying the institutional framework for future labor migrants. 
However, it may also be interpreted as a carrot and stick approach to fostering state-
imposed “integration”, as demanded by then-minister of the interior Sarkozy
12. 
Sarkozy’s own willingness to consider and openly discuss concrete immigration 
quotas in order to “master immigration” have found their application in the planned 
law on “actively managed, not encountered immigration policy”, based among other 
things on “growth perspectives, labor market needs, and accommodation capacity” 
(Le Monde 8 February 2006, interview FR-GOV 1)
13. A recent report commissioned 
by the Ministry of Finance explicitly calls for active labor market recruitment of 
skilled migrants (MinFin 2006). Sarkozy’s own willingness to consider and openly 
discuss concrete immigration quotas in order to “master immigration” has spawned 
the 2006 Sarkozy II Law
i, tentatively entitled “regarding immigration and integration 
                                                 
11 In a much noted 3 August 2000 article in the influential center-right daily Le Figaro, the authors 
argued that “the call for foreign labor does not only target “brains”, […] but also low-skill or unskilled 
workers, seasonal and not”.  
12 In a press conference in 2004, Sarkozy argued that “We are now in a situation where immigration is 
uncontrollable because we refuse to demand an immigration we choose and for which we are 
responsible. Our integration system has broken down.” (cited in Kretzschmar 2005, 15) 
13 In the course of this press conference, the minister also stated that “The question of quotas, in other 
words, “immigration by choice” as opposed to “immigration by submission”, must be the subject of 
true debate without taboos or exclusions. {we must} not be content with the failure which, after ten 
years of illegal immigration, leads all governments to debate wide-ranging integration” (cited in 
Kretzschmar 2005, 15). 
  14(loi relatif à l'immigration et à l'intégration) (interviews FR-GOV-1, FR-GOV-2). 
This law combines a more restrictive approach towards family reunion in particular, 
motivated by concerns over rising numbers in this category as well as asylum seekers 
(interview FR-GOV-2), with new work permits aimed at highly qualified migrants. 
Following the rhetoric of “chosen” (choisie) rather than “imposed” (subie) migration, 
the previous practice, established in 1984, of permitting automatic legalization of 
individuals that can prove ten years of residence in France is ended and the hurdles for 
family reunion are raised considerably. Family reunion is subject to longer waiting 
periods and requires proof of economic self-sufficiency.  Similarly, foreign spouses of 
French citizens have to wait for three years as opposed to two before being granted an 
independent residency permit and need to prove four years of marriage, rather than 
two, before being able to apply for citizenship. Finally, the CAI now becomes 
mandatory, following its piloting (Le Monde 15 April 2006, 18 June 2006). Sarkozy 
has also announced the formation of a separate Ministry for Immigration and National 
Identity. Most innovative, however, is the introduction of the carte compétences et 
talents for skilled migrants, motivated by the desire to raise the level of labor migrants 
and to abandon the previous principle of a general labor market review as one 
condition for approving new work permits. Henceforth, this measure marks an open 
embrace of the new paradigm in labor migration policy found elsewhere.  
The law found approval in both houses of parliament, though some of the provisions 
concerning foreign spouses of French citizens were liberalized somewhat (Le Monde 
18 June 2006). The unions were relatively silent on the issue, with the exception of 
the left-wing CGT (interview FR-UNI-2). By contrast, the employer association 
Medef, which was informally consulted, enthusiastically supported the new direction 
chosen in labor migration, especially for multinational corporations, but also, to some 
  15extent, for sectors experiencing labor market shortages (interview FR-GOV-2). 
Perhaps most telling and in line with the patterns described earlier, most provisions 
concerning labor migration were hatched out within the ministry and in informal 








System of Political Economy – Access for Labor Market Interest Associations 
The German political economy served as the paradigmatic model for Hall and 
Soskice’s category of coordinated market economies (CMEs). Its traits are said to 
encompass a mutually reinforcing network of highly organized industrial relations, 
tight networks between banks and private sector companies, and para-public 
institutions providing public goods, notably high educational levels of attainment. 
One of the most vivid debates in the comparative political economy literature focuses 
on the question to what extent this German model may be in decline, disintegration, 
metamorphosis or indeed full-scale convergence. Thus, there is an empirically 
strongly supported streak that underlines the radically changing nature of the 
institutions (Streeck 1997, Harding and Paterson 2000, Streeck and Höpner 2003, 
Dyson and Padgett 2005) and their policy output (Menz 2005b, Menz 2005c). No-one 
expects full convergence on the Anglo-American liberal model anymore, however. 
“Convergence within diversity” (Lütz 2004)  may be a more accurate label. That said, 
Germany generally continues to rely on high-wage high value added high-quality 
production. As such, employers are interested in maintaining and enhancing 
institutions that provide public goods, including education, but they have been 
  16considerably less committed to traditional neocorporatist institutions of industrial 
relations. Traditionally highly regulated labor markets have become considerably less 
so due to the decline of union density, more aggressive employers, questionable 
strategies to “exit’ from the general wage brackets by businesses leaving their 
employer organizations or pursuing corporate restructuring with an eye on escaping 
the confines of these organizations and hence the obligation to pay standard wages 
(Streeck and Hassel 2004, Menz 2005b). In the West (East), a striking 32 (48) percent 
of employees were not covered by standard wage agreements in 2004, a further 7 (12) 
percent were subject to an in-house company level contract. In the service sector, 
particularly in low-skill professions, this shift away from regulated industrial relations 
had probably proceeded furthest, although secondary substandard tiers of the labor 
market existed  previously, as the influential mid-1980s journalistic study Ganz Unten 
reveals (Walraff 1988). In this sense, the absence of a national minimum wage can 
become problematic, especially as there are sectors with no sectoral minimum wage
14. 
This became evident in the large-scale posting of employees from low-wage EU 
member states to Germany in the framework of the EU-induced liberalization of 
service provision, which affected especially the construction sector (Menz 2005a). 
Portuguese subcontractors could thus offer their services at Portuguese wages
15. But 
there are marked differences in preferred corporate strategies that surfaced in the 
elaboration of the German legislative re-regulation of the EU liberalization of service 
provision:  SMEs often perceive of subcontractors employing posted workers or 
                                                 
14 But even where they exist, some sectoral minima are really truly minimal, as research by the union 
think tank Boeckler Foundation  highlights. Not only do only 6 out of 40 economic sectors have 
nationwide wage agreements, but some sectoral minimum wages in low-skill manufacturing, 
gardening, security, and security services hover around 5 euros per hour (WSI 2005, quoted in 
Czammer and Worthmann 2005).  
15 But it has re-surfaced in a slightly modified fashion the aftermath of EU eastward enlargement. 
While the ban on labor mobility from CEE also applies to service provision, independent entrepreneurs 
are exempt from this ban. Hence, “independent” CEE contractors are employed by German meat-
processing plants, receiving central European wages (Czommer and Worthmann 2005). 
  17undocumented employees as a menace, larger companies welcome these “exit” 
opportunities, though the latter obviously do not publicize this fact.   
 
The employers maintained an interest in the guestworker system even after the end 
to active recruitment, but were not particularly successful vis-à-vis political circles. 
Joppke (1999, 70)  among others suggest the increasing “securitization” of the 
migration issue from the 1970s onwards, including concerns over “ghettoization” and 
xenophobic sentiments, which meant that economic prerogatives faded in importance, 
while Green (2004) points to the much better links enjoyed by the labor market 
interest associations to the ministry of labor and social affairs rather than to the 
ministry of the interior, which became predominant in designing migration policy. 
The employers remained indeed relatively taciturn on the issue in the 1980s, having 
witnessed the failure of their earlier campaign for a continuation of the guestworker 
system, but started to change position by the mid-1990s. From a business perspective, 
advocating new labor migration not only would have been difficult to defend 
politically – with the party representing the natural political ally being somewhat 
divided over the ally – but would have only been necessary in low wage low skill jobs 
in sectors that experiences some recruitment problems, notably gastronomy and 
agriculture
16. The change in the attitude among the BDA originated within the BDI 
                                                 
16 The slow but steady rise in unemployment throughout the Kohl years, partly masked through early 
retirement, did not provide a climate amiable to such lobbying. Lack of labor supply was much less of a 
problem and already existent cracks in the often stylized “regulated” labor market did permit some 
substandard employment practices in such sectors. A more structural explanation is the delayed change 
towards the tertiary sector; as recently as the late 1980s, including only 55 percent of all employees.  
By 1983, the employers organization BDA had not only given up its earlier lobbying, it was supporting 
the end to active labor market recruitment, along with restrictive border controls, repatriation efforts 
and efforts to boost the educational levels of the then second generation, as a position paper reveals 
(BDA 1983). In a 1993 document, the BDA still deemed unnecessary a specific immigration law, 
containing quotas for the highly skilled, though it not longer rejected the re-invention of a limited 
guestworker scheme (Marshall 2000, 155). Its dominant constituent sectoral member for the 
metalworking sector Gesamtmetall did not face significant skill shortages. 
  18and its outspoken mid-1990s president Hans-Olaf Henkel. Henkel has repeatedly 
radical neoliberal restructuring. Legal labor migration was very much part of this 
strategy.  The BDA slowly warmed up to this attitude. Henkel himself was part of 
both government expert commissions and harshly criticized the Christian Democrats’ 
rejection of labor migration quotas. His successor in office rejected any quantitative 
limits to quotas, or at least setting them at 300,000 annually, a tenfold increase over 
the quota proposed by the 2001 commission (Sueddeutsche Zeitung 11 June 2001). In 
2000, Gesamtmetall launched a vociferous and financially well-equipped, if ill-
informed, PR campaign entitled New Social Market Economy (Neue Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft), aimed at influencing public opinion and media reports in favour of 
neoliberal restructuring (Leif 2004), disposing of an annual public relations budget of 
10 million Euros
17. Not coincidentally, immigration of “highly qualified foreigners” is 
one of its many proposals based on the “know how”, “contribution to economic 
growth” and “ the future” that skilled migrants may make (Stiftung Marktwirtschaft 
2002, 8; 2004). German employers, though institutionally not strongly centralized, 
have thus commenced to assume a common position. They enjoy relatively good 
access to the government as do unions.     
Obviously, informal lobbying is open to all actors. But trade unions and employers 
have long-standing competency in labor market policy issues and are routinely invited 
by ministry of the labor for informal consultations in the drafting of legislation. Green 
(2004) accurately points out that the shift of authority in migration policy-making to 
the ministry of interior impeded the influence of these two actors. Yet both have 
                                                 
17 By then, labor market shortages were becoming much more apparent. In the fall of 2004, 
Kannegiesser, president of Gesamtmetall and founding member of the New Social Market Economy 
initiative, declared that not only were there 150,000 open positions in his sector, but this figure had 
increased by 40,000 since the beginning of the year. The last minister of economics in Schroeder’s 
cabinet Wolfgang Clement, an self-declared admirer of Margaret Thatcher, is also a member of the 
initiative.   
  19managed to establish connections to the ministry of the interior since this shift 20 
years ago, which are, admittedly nowhere near as tight or formalized. Both actors 
were represented in the two expert committees on immigration commissioned by the 
government, in which the representative of the employers Henkel strongly supported 
skilled migration.  
 
The trade unions’ stance towards migration has not changed dramatically over the 
years. The DGB’s main concern over the years has been the integration of immigrants 
into the main labor market and the avoidance of any bifurcation. It has traditionally 
utilized its contacts to the Social Democrats to lobby in favor of respect for the rights 
of resident migrant populations. At all levels of the organization, the official stance 
has been one of favoring non-discrimination and anti-racism. Naturally, the slow 
disintegration of the labor market is some parts of the service sector through the 
strategic use of immigrants is a development that has caused some concern within the 
union. Thus, the union was open to suggestions for long-term labor migration, but 
remained highly sceptical of short-term labor migration, including the Green Card 
program and the bilateral labor treaties. Their concern was that labor migration would 
be pursued in place of (re)training measures for resident migrants and the resident 
unemployed. They therefore supported sector-specific labor migration, but tightly 
regulated, defined by annual quotas as well as a point system assessing the 
qualification level, and dependent on the sectoral labor market situation (interview D 
– UNI1, DGB 2001a, 2001b).  Represented in the expert committees, the unions thus 
generally supported the draft migration bill, but remained wary that excessively 
permissively regulated labor migration would contribute to the disintegration of the 
labor market, while no attention was paid to long-term residents with no legal access 
  20to the labor market at all, especially the “tolerated” refugees (DGB 2001c, DGB 
2003). The strongest sectoral union IG Metall strongly supported this stance (IG 
Metall 2002). The unions were not unhappy about responsibility for the actual 
examination of the labor market situation  - carried out to determine the labor market 
access of individual newcomers – remaining at the local level, where a somewhat 
restrictive legacy exists (Cyrus and Vogel 2005, 26ff.). Though also not strongly 
centralized as actors, the union camp thus pursues a common position and enjoys 
good government access.   
 
Policy since 1989 and the role of non-state actors  
Having labored over a new law governing foreign residents for years, the Kohl 
government took four major measures in the 1990s. It dramatically impeded access to 
political asylum, it reformed the citizenship law to ease access by long-term non-
German residents, imposed an annual quota for ethnic Germans, and sought to 
regulate and limit migration from Eastern Europe by establishing bilateral labour 
recruitment programmes with countries in that region. The latter were the outcomes of 
employer lobbying for a temporary flexible labor force due to labor market shortages 
in agriculture and construction, though foreign policy considerations also played a 
role
18. 
                                                 
18 A a number of bilateral labour treaties were signed with a number of eastern and southeastern 
European countries to permit temporarily workers (Werkvertragsarbeitnehmer) from these 
countries to work in sectors such as construction, agriculture, and tourism. Commencing in 1988 
with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Austria, numbers rose from a total of 
14,593 in 1988 to an all time high of 94,902 in 1992. Typically, bilateral labour contracts are 
concluded with countries that already serve as pools of illegal labour migration. Thus, illegal 
migration is channelled, controlled, and presumably curtailed, with beneficial effects for all 
involved: Higher wages and greater security for workers and protection from law enforcement 
“crackdowns” for employers. In practice, the picture is a lot less pretty, since abusive pay and work 
conditions often persist and these legal channels commonly are used to transmit illegal workers as 
well (Menz 2001). 
  21 
In terms of labor migration policy, the Red-Green government launched a 
temporary labour recruitment programme in 2000 for 20,000 highly skilled migrants, 
particularly in IT (the so-called “green card” initiative), reflecting short-term labor 
market shortages.  
The Minister for the Interior Schily meanwhile commissioned a report from a 
commission composed of academics, legal experts, the social partners and politicians 
from all parties, headed by moderate Christian Democrat Süssmuth during the 
summer of 2001. In light of sustained opposition from the Christian Democrats, 
Schily was unwilling to heed the call for annual migration quotas, however, which the 
representative of the employers in the commission had fervently supported. Of 
symbolical significance is the first sentence: Deutschland ist ein Einwanderungsland 
(Unabhängige Kommission 2001), marking the final rejection of the previous 
paradigm. The law was finally accepted by the Bundestag on 1 July and by the 
Bundesrat on 9 July 2004, bearing the revealing title “Law on the management and 
limitation of inward migration and the regulation of the residence and integration of 
EU citizens and foreigners“ (Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung 
und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und 
Ausländern), and came into effect as of 1 January 2005 (BGBl Part I No. 41 1950 of 5 
August 2004)
19. With regards to labor migration, Art. 18 is of particular importance, 
                                                 
19 It contained the following main provisions: The previous bewildering array of five categories of 
residency permit (Morris 2002, esp. 47ff.)  were being reduced to two (unlimited and limited), a new 
coordinating agency for migration and refugees, reporting to the ministry of interior and assuming the 
duties of the central unit for asylum claims, creating labor migration channels for entrepreneurs 
investing at least one million euros and creating at least ten new jobs and carefully delineated 
categories of highly skilled migrants, including teachers, scientists, and skilled managers earning in 
excess of 100,000 euros (all defined in Art. 19), permitting foreign graduates of German universities to 
remain in the country for one additional year to search for employment, a minor improvement for the 
“tolerated” refugees who are granted residency permits if no deportation can be implemented within 18 
months, and eligibility for language and civic culture courses for newcomers, with this right becoming 
  22given that it specifies that in processing an application for a work permit (henceforth 
linked to a residency permit), consideration should be given to the labor market 







System of Political Economy/ Access for Non-State Actors 
The British system of political economy has commonly been subsumed under the 
category of liberal market economy (Hall and Soskice 2001), sharing traits with other 
Anglo-American economies, though this is technically only accurate since 
Thatcherism radically recast the role of the state, the size and function of the public 
sector, industrial relations, and to a less extent welfare state provisions, thus “only in 
1979, under the ideological onslaught of Thatcher, did the UK become anything like a 
pure case of LME”  (Goodin 2003, 207). Such system is generally characterized by 
the absence of coordinated wage bargaining arrangements, few or no institutions 
providing either public goods such as educational services or a distribution of labor 
resources that avoids labor “poaching” to overcome distributional conflicts. Indeed, 
the powers of trade unions has been severely reduced through Thatcher’s legislation 
in the 1980s. One of the results of the monetarist shock therapy of the early 1980s has 
been the deliberate and often hasty decline – if not to say destruction - of 
manufacturing and the concurrent support of the growth of financial and business 
supply services. As Table 2 indicates, the tertiary sector employs nearly 80 percent of 
the total labor force and accounts for almost three quarters of the GDP. By contrast, 
                                                                                                                                            
an obligation for specified resident migrants. Language skills are now a mandatory requirement for 
both ethnic Germans and Jewish migrants from the successor states to the Soviet Union. 
  23the percentage of employees in industry (19.1) is significantly lower than in all other 
countries included in this study. The slight discrepancy between the percentage of the 
workforce and the actual contribution to the GDP in services suggests relatively low 
productivity, affordable to employers via low wages.  1995 OECD data similarly 
demonstrates the concentration of individuals born outside of the UK and/or not in 
possession of UK citizenship in the services sector (657,000), as opposed to 
manufacturing (178,000). Services should be understood to include the public service, 
too, as labor recruitment for the public healthcare sector has been re-launched, 
focusing both on nurses and doctors, for the recruitment of which bilateral treaties 
were signed with the governments of India, the Philippines, South Africa, and 
Indonesia, including a legally non-binding commitment to refrain from potentially 
damaging “poaching” practices. Indeed, between one third and one half of staff 
positions in the NHS are filled with foreign nationals (Kelly, Morrell and 
Sriskandarajah 2005) and recruitment into secondary teaching professions principally 
from Australia and New Zealand (BBC News 2000) and tertiary education from all 
over the world is also quite active.    
 
  The contribution made by migrants has not been lost on employers federation 
who have been generally very active in lobbying in favor of  “managed” migration. 
Thus, in mid-2005 CBI president Digby Jones stressed the advantage Britain enjoyed 
thanks to its flexible labor markets and pragmatic labor migration schemes, having 
earlier proclaimed that “capital can’t afford to be racist for lots of reasons” (CRE 
2003)
20. His public intervention was made in response to the Conservative Party’s 
                                                 
20  In a 5 January 2006 policy statement (CBI 2006), the CBI re-affirmed this position, announcing that: 
“The CBI believes that migration is beneficial to the UK. Migrants have made an important 
contribution to the UK economy - bringing valuable and scarce skills that have benefited UK 
business and helped contribute to economic growth. Migrant workers are an integral part of the UK 
  24plan to introduce tightly capped migration quotas. This position has been warmly 
received by the government; during an Arpil 2004 speech at the CBI prime minister 
Anthony Blair argued that “recognition of the benefits that controlled migration brings 
not just to the economy but to delivering the public and private services on which we 
rely” was needed, along with “being clear that all those who come here to work and 
study must be able to support themselves. There can be no access to state support or 
housing for the economically inactive”. (cited in Geddes 2005). There is no doubt that 
British employers assume an active stance in advocating immigrants considered of 
economic utility, while the association is much less active regarding asylum. 
Employers are thus organizationally unified and they assume a common position. 
There is no formal institutional access for lobbying, however, there is some evidence 
to suggest ideological proximity between employer preferences and policy output. 
Indeed, the employer association very strongly supports the persistence of largely 
deregulated labor markets and the use of economic migrants, both at the low skill low 
wage and the high skill high wage end of the labor market (interview UK-BUS-1).  
 
The British unions have traditionally maintained a fairly reserved stance 
towards immigration, perceiving of it as a potential threat to wage levels and working 
conditions (cf. Hansen 2000), and fearing the use of migrants as a bargaining chip in 
the hands of employers, akin to the US experience. However, this position began to 
change in the 1970s, when the unions became active in fighting discrimination and 
                                                                                                                                            
workforce and the CBI shares the Government's belief that a carefully managed migration policy 
can bring further benefits to the UK. Although a well-targeted migration policy can alleviate current 
skill and labour shortages, raising the skills of the domestic workforce and improving labour market 
participation rates must be the priority. The CBI supports the Government’s plans, outlined in 5 
year strategy, to introduce a points test for skilled migration and rely on EU migration for lower-
skilled workers, with a reduced role for schemes such as the SBS and SAWS. It is important that 
the Government maintains a range of routes into the country in order to react to labour market 
needs. The CBI has written to the Home Office opposing the imposition of employer bonds for 
migrant workers and the use of on-the-spot fines for illegal working.”
  25racism at the meso level. In assessing the stance of the unions and its capacity to 
shape policy, the climate existent in the aftermath of the fiercely anti-union legislation 
of the Thatcher governments and the slightly obsessive attempts by Blair since to cut 
ties with the labor movement needs to be taken into consideration. The union 
movement is fairly feeble policy actor. It does undertake lobbying activity in the field, 
defending the legal position of employees and attempting to counteract exploitative 
practices. Institutionally relatively weak with no pronounced link to the government, 
the union generally supports a proactive labor recruitment strategy (interview UK-
UNI-1) as long as these recruits benefit from standard wages and working conditions 
and are not exploited. Actively managed migration is perceived as a preferable 
strategy to irregular migration.  
 
Policy since 1989 and the role of non-state actors 
 
If a general restrictive line characterized British migration policy throughout 
the 1990s, it is important to distinguish between increasingly fierce and aggressive 
attempts to reduce the number of asylum claims on the one hand and a new 
increasingly pragmatic, if staunchly “economistic” approach towards labor migration 
on the other. In that sense, there seems to be very little discernible partisan cleavage – 
the distinction between “bad” asylum seekers and “good” economic migrants evident 
in New Labour’s approach was ultimately shared even (or especially) by the architects 
of the openly xenophobic 2005 Conservative electoral campaign.  
 
 
  26Labor migration has undergone considerable changes in recent years. After 
repeated legislative measures had limited the legal access to the labor market 
considerably, three key entry avenues remained for non-EU citizens, all of them 
tightly regulated: the Working Holiday Scheme, principally geared at short-term 
working experiences by Commonwealth citizens, an annual quota of 10,000 
temporary work placements for Central and Eastern Europeans, principally in 
agriculture, and case-by-case work permits granted to highly skilled individuals 
whose employers filed applications for them in select economic sectors experiencing 
labor shortfalls. The 2002 Act itself changed little, as it was principally geared at 
limiting territorial access by asylum seekers and undocumented migrants – thus 
rendering British migration policy indeed “firmer”, though not necessarily “fairer and 
faster” as the 1999 Green Book had promised. However, since then, there has been 
considerable activism in this domain. Remarkably, initiatives have been domestically 
grown, since the UK has not adopted any EU measures in the fields of third country 
nationals, labor migration, or family reunion. The main thrust of the – at times slightly 
botched and ill-executed reforms – is to re-structure and ultimately limit the schemes 
pertaining to low-skill migration, based on the strategy to permit CEE citizens free 
access to the labor market after 2004, while streamlining procedures for high-skill 
migrants into a “points” system, reflecting qualifications and labor market needs. 
Thus, the working holidaymakers scheme was first broadened in scope in 2003 to 
make greater allowances for New Commonwealth countries, only to be quantitatively 
limited again in February 2005. Meanwhile, the agricultural working scheme has 
similarly been reduced in size in 2004. At the same time, an explicit quota scheme 
was introduced for low-skill short-term labor migration in select sectors (sectors-
based scheme, Immigration Rules HC 395, paras. 135I-135K, Ensor and Shah 2005), 
  27especially gastronomy and food processing. The 2001 Highly Skilled Migrants 
Programme (HSMP) introduced an explicit point system, taking into consideration 
formal level of education, work experience, salary level, overall qualification and 
qualification of the spouse. Additional points were added for applicants in sectors 
with shortages – especially medicine – and, unlike the previous procedure, applicants 
themselves filed the application rather than their employer.  Such point system is also 
used to evaluate application by “entrepreneurs” who plan to establish businesses.  
  The most current policy proposal, its logic already apparent in its subtitle 
“Making Migration Work for Britain” and based on a “flexible, employer-led” logic 
(Home Office 2005, 9), will replace all of these schemes with a single, points-based 
labor migration system, comprising four tiers, the first one reserved for highly skilled 
professionals in fields such as IT, finance, medicine, and engineering, as well as 
“entrepreneurs”. Applicants in these groups receive permission to enter the UK to 
assist them in their job search. The second category is geared towards applicants in 
sectors experiencing shortages that cannot be filled domestically or within the EU, 
especially in nursing and teaching. The third tier consists of short-term, tightly 
quantitatively limited quota schemes that can be opened – and presumably closed – on 
short notice, replacing the agricultural and sector-based schemes. Finally, the fourth 
tier encompasses the working holiday schemes and short-term schemes for students. 
Both of these bottom two tiers will only be open to nationals of countries which have 
concluded repatriation agreements with the UK. 
It is no coincidence that the document reiterates on 12 occasions that employers will 
be consulted or that the scheme is employer-led. Some independent advisory body on 
skills will also be consulted. The UK points scheme as proposed is a paradigmatic 
example of business-driven labor recruitment schemes, emblematic of European 
  28migration schemes of the 21
st century: it distinguishes between “good” labor migrants 
and “bad” asylum seekers, whose figures need to be reduced (Home Office 2005, 
19ff), it is based on competition state logic and rhetoric (“Managed migration is not 
just good for our country. It is essential for our continued prosperity.”; Home Office 
2005, 7) and it entails a carrot and stick approach towards third countries to coax them 
into cooperating in deportation. 
  
    
Conclusion 
 
Whoever claimed that the state is “retreating” has obviously never studied 
migration policy. Claiming that policy and politics do not matter in this domain would 
simply be preposterous. European governments have discovered the notion of 
“managing” (or maitriser or steuern or gestire) migration.  Control over access, both 
in the territorial sense and in the sense of entitlement remains central to the functions 
of the state, even the neoliberalized competition state of the early 21
st century. 
Governments are eager to be perceived as “managing”, taking action and being in 
charge. But where carefully “managed” or “chosen” labor migrants are either 
accepted or at least rhetorically welcomed with open arms individuals seeking entry 
without any explicit invitation encounter a much less pleasant vision of Europe. 
Trade unions, hampered in some countries (F, UK) by a weak institutional 
basis, have assumed a relatively passive stance on labor migration, while being 
broadly supportive of carefully managed labor migration. In itself this represents a 
departure from a traditionally much more skeptical, if not to say reserved stance 
(Haus 2002, Watts 2002). In all three countries, unions have become active in fighting 
  29racism and discrimination in the workplace. German and to a lesser extent French 
unions have also attempted to lobby for a more pragmatic policy regarding resident 
migrants and their descendants. But active lobbying has been limited. 
Employers have been much more active lobbyists, at least in the UK and 
Germany. Organizationally they would have been best placed in Germany to affect 
change, less so in France and the UK. But the common position variable is crucial: In 
France, it was not strongly present (though there is some evidence that this may begin 
to change). In Germany, a common consensus on the issue similarly emerged 
relatively late on the general need for labor migration, while sectoral initiatives in 
sectors with labor shortages could be agreed upon earlier. While the federation of 
larger industry BDI was very enthusiastic from early on, not all sectoral employers 
shared this sense of excitement. The enthusiasm for annual labor quotas, pervasive 
among larger companies, was not readily shared by the SMEs.    Finally, in the UK 
such general consensus was reached relatively early and was widely shared.  
 
The second proposition hypothesizing that national systems of production 
influence employers preference is largely borne out by the empirical evidence. Of 
course, the need for labor migration has not been an easy position to defend for 
employers in light of high unemployment rates across all three countries, including 
‘hidden’ unemployment in the UK in the form of incapacity benefit recipients and an 
extraordinarily high prison population rate. However, clothed in the rhetorical terms 
of the purported need to compete for brains, appeals by business to government to 
ensure national competitiveness in their design of labor migration policy have been 
much more successful. 
  30Thus, British employers have become more actively concerned with labor 
migration policy in the wake of the highly advanced tertialization of the economy and 
clearly apparent skill and labor shortages. Labor recruitment focuses on the service 
sector and seeks to compensate for deficiencies in domestic training institutions. 
Concerns over such shortages especially in engineering, IT, and finance have resulted 
in employer advocacy of liberal provisions for individuals with such skills. By 
contrast, French employers have only recently discovered the benefits of labor 
migration, given that neither skills nor labor shortages were as readily apparent as in 
Germany or the UK. Also, short-term labor market needs could be satisfied through 
the black economy shadow labor market an informal labor market as informed by an 
economic structure that did not generate the same levels of skills shortages. Recent 
French government activities suggest an embrace of actively managed labor migration 
policy that would appear to aim at highly skilled migrants wishing to aim either the 
manufacturing or service sector. German employers, especially those in the 
manufacturing sector, notably metal processing association Gesamtmetall, have been 
strongly supportive of highly skilled migration, complimenting a high skill high value 
added production strategy.    
Abandoning the common state-centric focus of the migration literature can be 
a fruitful exercise, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this paper. Bridging the gap 
between migration and some of the insights from the comparative political economy 
literature, it is argued that production regimes will influence the type of migrants 







  31Interviews: 
 
During 2004-2006, approximately 30 interviews were conducted with representatives 
of trade unions, employer associations, national ministries of interior affairs and labor 
and social affairs in all three countries discussed here. A number of background 
interviews were also conducted with national labor market and immigration experts. 
Direct references to these interviews are indicated in the text. The author would like to 
express his gratitude to the British Academy (SGS) and the University of London 
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